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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The emergency management body of knowledge can fairly be characterized as: dispersed 
across a multitude of disciplines; rife with methodological, theoretical, and conceptual 
challenges; and, replete with gaps. This is the case because the emerging discipline is young and 
dedicated emergency management scholars few. Much of the emergency management literature 
to date has come from disciplines such as geography, sociology, psychology, public 
administration, political science, and other similar well-established disciplines. This has 
challenged emergency scholars to assimilate research from many disciplines in an effort to 
synthesize existing research and to identify the gaps in research. While efforts to identify the 
literature rightly within emergency management’s body of knowledge have been underway for a 
couple of decades, they have been slow to materialize (Mileti, 1999, p. 11-15).  
Navigating the difficulties inherent to the emergency management body of knowledge 
requires substantial access to databases, libraries, and sources, as well as an appreciation of 
where to look to find this literature. Such navigation requires money and time to traverse which 
puts it outside the reach of many emergency management practitioners. This creates a knowledge 
gap between those who study emergency management and those who practice it. This gap 
includes literature relevant to the ways in which practitioners might leverage social capital to 
increase citizen preparedness and inform response efforts. Research in this area demonstrates the 
ways in which basic elements of human social behavior (like trust, social structures, and personal 
bonds) can be strategically leveraged to advance emergency management efforts focused on 
preparedness and response.  
The primary objectives of this effort are to provide: 1) a foundation for understanding 
social capital and networks in emergency response; 2) clear strategic guidance in preparedness 
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that leverages social capital and networks; and, 3) ample and clear evidence in support of 
strategic guide.  
This effort places relevant literature into five strategic domains with the intent of creating 
an easy to use strategy guide grounded in research for emergency management practitioner use 
(see Appendix A). The strategic domains focused on in the strategy guide are: 
Distributed Disaster Messaging Pre-Event; Stakeholder Engagement; Planning for the 
Socially Integrated Response; Organizational and Individual Trust, and Network-deepening 
Activities; and, Warnings and Information Dissemination. This strategy guide contains specific 
recommendations and corresponding benefits for each strategic domain drawn from a review of 
the literature. The strategy guide contains the citations from which the recommendations are 
drawn. This allows the reader to refer to the specific literature that grounds the 
recommendations.  By presenting the research findings in this way, the material is made more 
easily accessible and increases ease of use for emergency management practitioners.  
The strategy guide was intentionally formatted to afford emergency management 
practitioners the knowledge needed to support the implementation of research-based activities 
intended to further their preparedness and response efforts. The strategy guide coupled with the 
literature review herein is intended to supply emergency management practitioners the ability to 
further communicate the application and value of these evidence-based actions to others.  
A quick scan of the strategy guide (see Appendix A) before moving to the literature 
review will bring greater depth and understanding of the relevance and potency of the guide. The 
strategy guide has five columns under which each recommendation is identified and examined. 
The first column is the strategic sub-domain as identified by the literature. Second, column is the 
strategic rational driving the potential tactical approaches listed in the next column (3). Lastly, 
3 
benefits are presented in column four and sources are presented in column five. Much of the 
literature reviewed is not included in the strategy guide because only a small selection of articles 
featured actionable findings or suggestions. Notwithstanding, the information in the literature 























CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review explores the research relevant to preparedness and response in the 
domain areas laid out in the strategy guide. The importance of having a social network and social 
capital is explored first through the response literature and then through in the preparedness 
literature.  Before these topics are addressed, it is necessary to discuss what is known about 
human behavior in disasters and to define social capital and social networks.  
2.1. Assumptions in Human Behavior 
Reviewing what is known about human behavior during disasters is a necessary step in 
exploring subsequent research. Too often, the strongly-grounded evidence on this topic is not 
used to ground planning efforts or decisions.  The unfortunate reality is that many emergency 
management practitioners assume the individual has no role in response (Dynes, 1994; Helsloot 
& Ruitenberg, 2004; Scanlon, Helsloot & Groenendaal, 2014). This assumption could not be 
further from the truth. Individuals perform the overwhelming majority of the work in response 
(Dynes, 1994; Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004; Kruke, 2015). Moreover, they do so in an orderly, 
effective, and altruistic manner (Lowe & Fothergill, 2003; Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004; 
Scanlon, Helsloot & Groenendaal, 2014; Kruke, 2015).  
2.1.1. The Myth of Idleness and Antisocial Behaviors 
The myths of idleness and antisocial behaviors are perhaps the most essential 
misconceptions to debunk for the purposes of advancing emergency management practice in this 
area. Individuals’ involvement in disasters has been well-documented across years of disaster 
research, from Samuel Prince’s retelling of the Halifax explosion in 1917 (Prince, 1920), through 
the rise of Civil Defense, and the efforts of the Disaster Research Center (Wachtendorf & 
Kendra, 2004). Indeed, so pervasive is the research focus on individual participation in disasters 
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that to completely cover the topic would require examining almost the entirety of the response 
literature.  
This section is limited to a review of the literature focused specifically on the myths of 
idleness or antisocial behavior. Many of the assumptions about human behavior stem from an 
underlying military mindset that has existed in emergency management since its inception 
(Dynes, 1994; Baker, 2016). They are the byproduct of the pervasiveness of military perspectives 
and “command and control attitudes” to social imagination and negative media coverage (Dynes, 
1994). Planning with such assumptions places the emphasis on emergency management 
objectives on “regaining control” and “commanding.” These objectives center around the idea 
that social order is disrupted during a disaster. While institutions and the physical environment 
may be disrupted, research shows that social order will remain and, in many cases, exist in a 
more altruistic state following disaster (Yutzy,1970; Dynes, Quarantelli & Kreps, 1972; Dynes, 
1994; Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004).  
Planning with the assumption that the social order will be disrupted produces an 
emergency management planning process rooted in social control (Baker & Ludwig, 2016) 
rather than in facilitation. This results in less effective emergency management practice based on 
faulty paradigms. The extent to which the assumption of idleness and the paradigm of social 
control (i.e., curbing anti-social behavior) affects emergency management can be far reaching 
and result in resources being utilized ineffectively. Activities in preparedness are particularly 
likely to be affected by this paradigm as much of what is encouraged in regard to citizen 
preparedness is based upon the expectations associated with citizen behavior during response. 
Research suggests that there is a fundamental disconnect between how citizens view their actions 
and capacity in response versus how emergency managers view their actions and capacity 
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(Baker, 2016). The activities and objectives encouraged by emergency managers to increase 
citizen preparedness often assumes that the public they seek to influence is “complacent” and 
“potentially threatening” following a disaster (Dynes, 1994; Baker, 2016).  
Preparedness actions based on false assumptions treat the populace as vulnerable, 
inactive, and in need of formal assistance in order to function even at a basic level (Baker & 
Ludwig, 2016). Activities, such as having a 72-hour kit, demonstrates this mindset by assuming 
that most people will just sit and wait for formal assistance (assistance that could take 72 hours 
to arrive) (Federal Emergency Management Agency). While public safety officials tend to 
undersell the engagement of the civilian populace in a post-disaster context, civilians have been 
shown to assume their own involvement (Dynes, 1994; Baker, 2016).  This citizen-based 
capacity can be threatening to those who operate under assumptions of social control (Baker, 
2016): 
“The public capacity for emergence in disasters and in turn, unpreparedness, is viewed as 
threatening and implies a disintegration of social order that preparedness upholds. Some 
of the rationale for this is supported in the notion that preparedness has narrative 
structures that serve to reduce uncertainty that the acceptance of emergence and non-
planning can’t really accomplish within the current paradigm (p. 14).” 
 
The assumption that citizens will be idle, and exhibit potentially anti-social behaviors has 
been the source of much research. Exposing such disaster myths has been a foundational pursuit 
of key researchers in emergency management (Dynes, 1994; Fischer, 1998). Understanding what 
is fact and what is fiction can facilitate more effective planning and operations.   
The literature addresses these myths and the underlying assumptions. The myth that 
individuals are idle, useless, or do not participate stems from an assumption that the social order 
will degrade following a disaster. According to Dynes (1994), the assumption that panic, 
antisocial behavior, and irrational conduct will follow disasters is at the root of these myths. 
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Operating within the framework of these assumptions produces an emergency management 
planning process rooted in social control (Baker & Ludwig, 2016) rather than in facilitation. 
Each of these assumptions has been studied at length and each has been disproven.  
The most pervasive assumptions that underlie behavioral myths in disaster are focused on 
widespread looting, panic, shock and inaction (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1972; Quarantelli, 1994; 
Fischer, 1998; Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004; Sun, 2012; Baker & Ludwig, 2016). Widespread 
looting has been observed as an extremely rare occurrence often catalyzed by pre-existing social 
factors (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1972; Quarantelli, 1994; Fischer, 1998; Sun, 2012). Panic, too, has 
been disproven and has been found to be nearly non-existent; rather, rational action is the 
documented norm during times of disaster (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1972; Quarantelli,  
1994; Fischer, 1998; Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004; Sun, 2012; Baker & Ludwig, 2016;). 
Similarly, shock has been found to be a faulty assumption (Fischer, 1998; Helsloot & 
Ruitenberg, 2004; Sun, 2012). Finally, the notion of citizen inaction has likewise been disproven 
with robust documentation of citizen involvement in response evident across the emergency 
management literature (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1972; Quarantelli, 1994; Fischer, 1998; Helsloot & 
Ruitenberg, 2004; Sun, 2012; Baker & Ludwig, 2016;).  
2.1.2. Situational Altruism: The Character of Collective Response 
One of the research cornerstones exploring citizen behavior in disaster is “Situational 
Altruism: Toward an Explanation of Pathologies in Disaster Assistance” by Russell Dynes 
(1994). Dynes coined the term “situational altruism”, to capture the phenomenon surrounding 
citizens’ predictable and altruistic responses following a disaster. This phenomenon emerges as a 
result of several key catalysts. Understanding the catalysts of situational altruism can help 
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emergency management practitioners predict, assist, and plan more effectively for public 
responses. 
The catalysts of situational altruism often revolve around shifting social norms. As 
situations change, norms or social expectations and behaviors adapt to suit new conditions 
(Quarantelli & Dynes, 1968; Weller & Quarantelli, 1973; Tierney, 1980). Hence, emergent 
norms give rise to situational altruism. Dynes explored the ways in which disasters affected the 
social landscape and gave rise to situational altruism (1994). Most simply put, Dynes described it 
as a shift in the definition of the situation – a recognition that “normal” has changed (Dynes, 
1994). Disasters bring about a wide array of changes, from institutional to individual, and it is 
these changes that disrupt the “normal” and force a redefinition of the situation.  A good example 
of this is how media shift gears, change their language, and focus on different things relative to 
pre-disaster conditions (Pantti, Wahl-Jorgensen & Cottle, 2012). This departure from normal 
attitudes and perceptions is a key characteristic of changing norms. Understanding the ways in 
which these new norms emerge in regard to disasters can help emergency management 
practitioners recognize and leverage these emergent norms. 
Situational altruism typically follows patterns in duration, structure, and behavior (Dynes, 
1994). These characteristics, if well understood, are key to the positive application of this social 
phenomena. Of note, emergent norms and situational altruism are typically short in duration 
(Dynes, 1994; Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004). The response and short-term recovery periods will 
see the rise and decline of these new norms (Dynes, 1994). During this short period, collective 
behavior and decision making in the community undergo significant changes. Emergency 
consensus (Yutzy,1970; Dynes, Quarantelli & Kreps, 1972) is a collective decision-making 
process present during disasters. This collective alignment and adjustment of priorities drives 
9 
community efforts toward the safety and care of victims and very little else (Dynes, 1994; 
Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004). In addition, changes in social structures take place. This results 
in a dynamic array of social and organizational adjustments designed to meet the needs present 
in a disaster. Further, emergent groups will rise to meet needs, kinship aid and networks will be 
heavily leveraged, existing organizations will expand and repurpose capacities, volunteerism will 
rise dramatically (Dynes, 1994; Scanlon, Helsloot & Groenendaal, 2014), and social networks 
will be created and expanded to cope with disaster conditions (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; 
LaLone, 2012). 
A firm understanding of social phenomena following disasters is essential to planning 
for, and responding to, them effectively. Emergency management practitioners cannot command 
or control the socially integrative response. Emergent behavior during disasters is a product of 
social evolution and one purposed toward the preservation of human life (Piliavin & Charng, 
1990). Emergency management practitioners are best served by recognizing these pro-social 
behaviors as an asset that furthers their objectives to protect the citizenry and community.  
2.2. Emergence: The Socially Integrated Response 
With the recognition that citizens will in most situations participate positively in response 
(Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001; Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004), the opportunity and 
mechanisms by which to leverage said participation is relevant to successful emergency 
management practice.  Encouraging citizen participation can help create a stronger and more 
robust response that benefits the community.  This participation, often termed “emergence” in 
the literature, constitutes one of the most vital and pro-social elements of pubic behavior in a 
post-disaster context. 
10 
Researchers have long studied human behavior following disasters (Perry, Lindell, & 
Tierney, 2001). The emergence of “helping behaviors” in the civilian populace has been 
documented time and time again across various hazards, contexts and cultures (Tierney, Lindell, 
& Perry, 2001; Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004). Emergence is a catch-all term describing 
behaviors such as: volunteering, spontaneous organization, and other helping behaviors that 
surface following a disaster. This citizen behavior in response, also called the “Socially 
Integrated Response” (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004; Barnett & Flint, 2005; Scanlon, Helsloot, & 
Groenendaal, 2014; Kruke, 2015), has been shown to contribute in significant, essential, and 
unexpected ways, augmenting and even replacing formal response efforts. For example, a 
significant portion of all search and rescue operations are performed by people immediately on 
scene—the public (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004; Barnett & Flint, 2005; Scanlon, Helsloot, & 
Groenendaal, 2014; Kruke, 2015). Several incidents, like the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, 
illustrated that citizens were not only the first to start response activities, but in the case of search 
and rescue, they handled things almost entirely on their own (Scanlon, Helsloot & Groenendaal, 
2014). Citizens’ engage in a variety of tasks bring specific advantages with their efforts. The 
significance of their engagement has been specifically noted and chronicled in large major events 
such as Hurricane Katrina and 9/11 (Lowe & Fothergill, 2003; Hawkins & Maurer, 2009).  
Responding publics carry with them a series of irreplaceable and unteachable advantages 
as they pursue response actions. One study that examined community response after Hurricane 
Katrina inventoried the advantages that citizens bring to bear in a disaster: “local knowledge, 
action, participation, and control in determining the nature of disaster response” (Brennan, 2005, 
p. 2). These advantages can be vital in disaster responses, such as Hurricane Katrina, in which 
local knowledge was needed to aid non-local assistance (Brennan, 2005). Yet, as noted by 
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Brennan, many of the advantages were not used to their full advantage, and, in some cases, were 
in fact, hindered by the formal response (2005). Activities such as search and rescue, 
transportation, organization, volunteerism, and responding to unmet needs are forms of 
emergence (elements of the public’s response) that will happen regardless of how the formal 
response system operates. The disadvantage to emergency management practitioners of letting 
emergence go unrecognized is missing the opportunity to plan and prepare to leverage and assist 
it (Brennan, 2005). 
The post-9/11 response relied greatly on unsolicited and informal efforts by citizens and 
others outside the jurisdiction of the event (Lowe & Fothergill, 2003). One surprising 
characteristic of this public response was its apparent ability to adapt and utilize creative 
capacities to a greater degree than even the formal response could muster (Lowe & Fothergill, 
2003). First responders have training, procedures and a command structure to draw upon in 
response; the public response typically has none of these and instead relies heavily on innovation 
to meet needs. During the 9/11 response, creativity was evident in the public’s engagement. Even 
though the public lacked the knowledge and training of formal responders, they were able adapt 
a diverse set of capabilities to meet the challenges they faced (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; 
Lowe & Fothergill, 2003). 
Fundamental assumptions of human behavior, its characteristics and benefits during 
disaster are foundational to the discussion undertaken in this effort. The remainder of this 
literature review will focus on how social networks and social capital interact with response 
initiatives. The ways in which positive traits can be cultivated using various preparedness tactics 
are also examined. 
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2.3. Social Capital 
Social capital has a long and diverse history. As early as 1916, sociologists began to 
realize the importance of community and those social phenomena that created it (Hanifan, 1916). 
Other “capitals” - such as human and financial capital - presented scholars with clear ways to 
conceptualize how resources in a community could be leveraged. Social capital evolved through 
the 1950s, 60s and 70s (Putnam, 2000) until finally in the 1980s, a sociologist named James 
Coleman popularized the concept through his work in education (Coleman, 2000). Since 
Coleman’s popularization of the concept, social capital has been applied in fields such as 
community development and emergency management. Although this principle can apply to 
individuals as well as collectives, much of the research has focused on social capital in a 
community context. To better understand social capital, what it means, and why it is relevant to 
emergency management, the principle must first be clearly defined. 
Choosing the most applicable definition of social capital is a challenge as many 
definitions exist. Earliest definitions of the concept center around the individual’s interactions 
with social units like the family, exploring such issues as sympathy, trust and good will (Hanifan, 
1916). Coleman’s (2000) definition too focuses on issues of trust and networks but is far more 
concerned with how social capital acts as a driver of action for individuals and collectives. 
Robert Putnam, a political scientist from Harvard University, provides the definition most 
relevant to this discussion (2000). Putnam’s definition encompasses both individual and 
community level analyses in defining social capital as “features of social organization, such as 
networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” 
(2000, p. 67). The applicability of this definition to both the individual and community level 
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affords the level of flexibility necessary to apply it effectively in the emergency management 
context used in this effort. 
Social capital can be deconstructed into three major elements: bonding, bridging, and 
linkage, each element is essential to understanding the construct (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Although these three elements are essential in understanding social capital, they are rarely 
mentioned explicitly in emergency management literature. However, these elements are 
fundamental to understanding social capital and its relevance to findings within the emergency 
management literature.  
Bonding is a type of social capital that exists among those who have close emotional 
attachments to each other. This concept can be extended to encompass those of similar 
demographic and background characteristics (Adler & Kwon, 2002). High bonding can provide 
individuals with direct material, emotional, or informational support (Hurlbert, Haines & Beggs, 
2000). However, because bonding takes place among similar individuals or groups, assistance 
and information sharing tends to be somewhat limited in that this information is not distributed 
broadly beyond individuals or groups (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Mouw, 2006). 
Bridging is the social capital among individuals or groups that are loosely tied. This type 
of social capital exists among people who do not typically associate with one another or who do 
not have strong ties to each other. Examples such as class or race are appropriate here. Bridging 
provides unique advantages, just as bonding does. Information, aid, and services will be more 
diverse in an environment with high bridging as community assets and information are more 
available among community members (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Finally, linkage bridges the gap between citizens and those in power. Linkage is 
particularly important in emergency management as it describes the connections between the 
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formal (public safety organizations) and informal (civilian) responses. Typically, linkage 
encompasses a wide array of factors such as trust, political systems, and even power distribution. 
Although this term is broad, for the purpose of this discussion, the primary focus is the 
connection between the formal and informal responses. Understanding how the concept of social 
capital is discussed and dissected by sociologists is useful to applying knowledge in a practical 
setting and interpreting other literature (Hawkins & Maurer, 2009). Social capital has been 
addressed in the emergency management literature by prominent authors in emergency 
management (Dynes, 2005; Dynes, 2006; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Much of the social capital 
research in the emergency management literature is focused around the response phase. These 
elements of social capital were noted in response research to be sensitive to social structures and 
networks even before the structures and networks were expressly studied. Issues in information 
sharing, especially relative to warnings, have likewise provided emergency management scholars 
a comfortable a bridge via sociological theory. In research on “adaptive capacities” (Smit & 
Wandel, 2006), a collection of latent characteristics that were shown to improve overall 
effectiveness in response were identified. Although the range of characteristics identified were 
broad, discussion about the ways in which innate social capital influences individual 
effectiveness was undertaken in this research (Smit & Wandel, 2006). From these early forays 
into social capital through largely response-focused efforts, attention has turned to preparedness 
and the ways in which a focus on increased social capital in preparedness activities can 
ultimately benefit response efforts.   While not the focus of this effort, it must be noted that there 
is ample discussion of social capital in the recovery literature. 
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2.4. Social Capital in Response 
Exploring social capital as it appears in response is a necessary step in understanding its 
implications in preparedness. Key areas of study in response regarding social capital are from the 
warning and information literature.  In addition, there are studies that focused on social capital as 
a characteristic and positive trait during response. A review of this literature sheds light on how 
social capital has been demonstrated to improve response efforts. 
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive pieces of literature available to illustrate social 
capital’s impact in response is Dynes’ Social Capital: Dealing with Community Emergencies 
(2006). Dynes uses more than 40 years of response research to explore the idea of social capital 
in response.  Dynes’ findings and observations over years of research prompted him to delve into 
analysis of the response research from a social capital perspective. Findings from Dynes’ 
literature review are extensive and cover topics such as emergence. Dynes views emergence as 
the creation of new social capital (2006):  
In many instances it [emergence] emerges from existing social capital, but at other 
times it is ‘new’ in that it is created to meet new problems created by the disaster. 
This view is contrary to most media accounts of disaster, which portray 
community structure as fragile and unable to deal with disaster problems, often 
implicitly suggesting that ‘survival’ is dependent on external aid. (p. 4) 
 
As established in earlier discussion, emergence is a positive force in response and one 
over which emergency management practitioners have very little control. According to Dynes 
(2006), this emergence of new or growing social capital manifests in a number of key ways 
during response. Shifts in social obligation, a facet of social capital, and individual priorities 
drive all other manifestations of emergence. Citizens become focused on immediate and pressing 
needs like search and rescue (Dynes, 2006). Additionally, citizens’ perceptions of social 
obligation change from more individualistic to more community-focused with the “neighbor 
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helping neighbor” phenomena becoming a constant (Dynes, 2006). Dynes also notes that 
fundamental shifts in norms occur, creating communities where altruism becomes a norm (2006). 
This shift in obligations and norms tends to manifest in volunteerism and other prosocial and 
organized activities which afford formal organizations with a significant force multiplier. This 
phenomenon can also put isolated individuals in greater risk as their networks may be too small 
to accrue immediate (e.g., rescue or medical transport) and sustained (e.g., shelter) assistance 
(Dynes, 2006). 
These pro-social phenomena can be manipulated pre-event through the cultivation of 
social capital in a community or neighborhood. Dynes (2006) found that the more informal 
relationships that existed pre-event, the more opportunities and pro-social behavior was present 
post event. While this finding may seem obvious, it is the extent to which it impacts response 
that is notable. Social organization is also a topic that Dynes (2006) covers heavily as many 
forms of emergence, such as volunteerism, are actualized through social organizations. Social 
organizations are a type, and consequence, of social capital. 
There are social capital functions that can be leveraged by emergency management 
practitioners during response to increase community efficacy (Dynes, 2006). The foundational 
note for emergency management practitioners on this point is to plan to support, not restrict, 
civilian activities. A command and control model cannot be successfully applied to a civilian 
response. The types of actions that can be taken to support civilian response include planning for 
emergence by focusing on information sharing and the readiness and ability to share tools and 
equipment usage. 
Other researchers have found similar advantages in leveraging social capital in response. 
In addition to creating surplus assistance for more standardized functions and services, 
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specialized functions and services that might be unavailable within the formal response can 
emerge. In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, unique needs such as emotional care, physical 
therapy, and mass feeding arose and were met by specialized civilian responders with the 
knowledge and capacity to meet those needs effectively, thereby filling gaps in the formal 
response (Watchtendorf & Kendra, 2004). Wachtendorf and Kendra (2004), found: 
Volunteer convergence may, for example, bring certain abilities that do not exist 
in sufficient quantities in the established response organizations; they may already 
be close enough to damaged areas to provide immediate assistance; and they may 
provide for the flexibility that is needed when organizations confront rapidly-
changing conditions. (p.2) 
 
Aldrich & Meyer reiterate the advantages of high social capital for individuals and 
communities saying, “individual and community social capital networks provide access to 
various resources in disaster situations, including information, aid, financial resources, and child 
care along with emotional and psychological support…” (2015, p.3). Hawkins and Maurer 
examined social capital in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina by considering the ways in 
which bridging, bonding, and linkage interact in a post-disaster environment (2010).  Hawkins 
and Maurer reinforced that individuals benefit and leverage all three forms of social capital 
(2010). In addition, they found that the networks formed in the post-disaster environment 
transcended race and class binding the community to common goals in unique ways. In contrast, 
individuals with weak social capital have reduced social and network capacity and suffer as a 
result of it (Hawkins and Maurer, 2010). 
Very few topics in the emergency management literature share the level of consistency 
and consensus that social capital in response does. Studies focused on social capital have 
delivered similar and supportive findings throughout the years and validated the importance of 
social capital in emergency management response across a variety of topics. A key area within 
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response where social capital research adds specific value is regarding warnings and information. 
This literature is reviewed below with the intent of deepening emergency management 
practitioners understanding of the ways in which social capital affects the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms. 
2.5. Warnings and Information 
The topics of the delivery of warnings and information to the public have been studied 
since WWII and the Civil Defense era. Within this subset of the response literature, social capital 
and networks have become topics of great interest. In both of these topical areas, metrics and 
methodologies are similar (i.e., measuring warnings/evacuation rates and adherence).  
Warning literature represents one of the largest topical bodies of the response literature. 
Within this topical focus, researchers have narrowed their efforts to specific issues that are vital 
to a discussion of social capital such as: social contact (Sorensen, 2000), process (Drabek, 1969), 
and networks (Sadri, Ukkusuri, & Gladwin, 2017). The warning literature notes that warning is a 
social process; this means that typically, individuals do not make warning-related decisions on 
their own but rather as a part of a social system (Drabek, 1969; Riad & Norris, 1998; 
Kirschenbaum & Rapaport, 2009; Lindell & Perry, 2012). The consequence of this finding is that 
warnings need to be crafted to facilitate, and operate in, that social process (Drabek, 1969).  
In a study that examined the influence of social and demographic characteristics on 
hurricane evacuation rates, race and gender yielded interesting results stemming from differential 
attitudes and norms with regard to social network, capital and influence (Riad and Norris, 1998). 
In an earlier study, researchers found that women are more open to risk communication from 
their social networks than men, and blacks were more open to social influence based on the 
depth of black kinship networks as opposed to white kinship networks (Cazenave & Straus, 
19 
1979). In both of these studies, the findings were imbedded in the social networks and capitals of 
the individual. Often, a single phone call could prompt evacuation decisions (Cazenave & Straus, 
1979). Network size, cohesion and composition have been a focal point of many studies 
attempting to understand the social processes involved in warnings and decision making (Riad & 
Norris, 1998; Riad, Norris & Ruback, 1999; Sadri, Ukkusuri & Gladwin, 2017). Findings have 
generally been consistent with network largess, composition, and cohesion positively influencing 
the process (Riad & Norris, 1998; Riad, Norris, & Ruback, 1999). 
The process of confirmation, as addressed in the warning literature, explores the process 
by which warnings are confirmed by other sources (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 1969; 
Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Bean, et al., 2015; Jin, Fraustino &, Liu, 2016; Wood, et al., 2017). 
This socially imbedded confirmation behavior, termed “milling” can have the effect of slowing 
warning adherence (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 1969; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Bean, et 
al., 2015; Wood, et al., 2017). In an early study of this process, 61% of the families studied 
displayed confirmation behaviors (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 1969; Mileti & Sorensen, 
1990; Bean, et al., 2015; Jin, Fraustino &, Liu, 2016; Wood, et al., 2017). 
The ways in which individuals respond to warnings and information has been shown to 
be a complex process with many variables to consider like audience demographics, time, hazard, 
experience, warning content and community context (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Riad, Norris & 
Ruback, 1999; Liu, Fraustino &, Jin, 2015; Bean, et al., 2015; Jin, Fraustino &, Liu, 2016; 
Wood, et al., 2017). Warning and information dissemination operate in a social medium. One 
must consider how formal actions in warning and information dissemination during response, 
interacts within this medium. Knowing the level of disaster experience (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; 
Riad & Norris, 1998; Liu, Fraustino &, Jin, 2015; Bean, et al., 2015), frequency of warnings 
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(Mileti &, Sorensen, 1990; Kirschenbaum & Rapaport, 2009; Bean, et al., 2015), demographic 
characteristics (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Sorensen, 2000; Bean, et al., 2015; Wood, et al., 2017), 
local hazard characteristics (Sorensen, 2000), community norms (Riad & Norris, 1998; Liu, 
Fraustino &, Jin, 2015; Bean, et al., 2015), and the social landscape (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; 
Drabek, 1969; Drabek &, McEntire, 2003; Jin, Fraustino &, Liu, 2016; Wood, et al., 2017) can 
provide vital information about how warnings and information will be received and processed by 
individuals. 
2.6. Preparedness 
Preparedness impacts all other phases of the emergency management cycle. It presents 
unique opportunities to leverage research in ways that can improve outcomes in the other phases. 
Social capital is a yet untapped wealth of activities in preparedness. Baker’s illustration of the 
linkage between preparedness and recovery speaks to the ability to reach beyond pre-event 
phases to achieve post-event outcomes: “The notion of preparedness weaves together temporal 
gaps where pre-disaster action connects to post-disaster recovery, creating a vision seamless 
between these two contexts that feeds into the necessary creation of ontological security.” 
(Baker, 2014, p.19). The preparedness phase and the research literature regarding preparedness 
has historically been focused, almost myopically, on response. 
Historically, there have been differences in how preparedness is defined in the field of 
emergency management (Gillespie & Streeter, 1987; Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001; 
Kirschenbaum, 2002; Sutton & Tierney, 2006; Staupe-Delgado & Kruke, 2017). This is 
indicative of a larger issue in the emergency management literature which was developed for 
decades in other disciplines. More recent efforts at synthesis have resulted in recognition of 
similar concepts across many definitions. For the purposes of this effort, (the definition used is 
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Jensen’s (2016): “A state of readiness at any given time for both response and recovery that’s 
dependent upon a process that individuals and households have to undertake and maintain and 
can only be understood within the wider context of those individuals and households.” 
2.6.1. Latent Characteristics in Preparedness 
The most consistent and beguiling focus of preparedness literature remains focused on 
the question: What makes preparedness effective? Research shows that success in furthering the 
individual preparedness agenda has been challenging for a number of reasons (Baker, 2014):  
Traditional disaster preparedness, however, is not without its issues. A large body 
of research has shown that people have problems coordinating and managing 
preparedness efforts for disasters (see Quarantelli 1985; Kartez and Lindell 1987; 
Quarantelli 1988, for example). Most have difficulty preparing for unpredictable 
and rare events of unknown proportions due to a variety of reasons (Burby and 
French 1980; Mader et al. 1980; Drabek et al. 1983; Christianson et al. 2009). The 
incorporation of preparedness practices for rare and unusual events into everyday 
life is also a pervasive issue for organizations (Marcus and Nichols 1999; Harding 
et al. 2002; Lampel et al. 2009). (p.2) 
A growing body of literature has shown that traditional activities (e.g., kits and plans) are 
only a fraction of the picture and moreover, are a poor metric for citizen preparedness. 
Researchers have turned their attention to “implicit” or “latent” preparedness. The difference 
between explicit and implicit activities are defined as (Baker, 2013): 
Explicit practices are the traditional preparedness actions people engage in accordance 
with official recommendations. In contrast, implicit practices are activities, tools, and 
resources people use in everyday life not consciously associated with disaster 
preparedness that could be drawn on and adapted in post disaster situations. (p.1) 
 
While explicit activities in preparedness are easy to conceptualize and constitute more obvious 
preparedness actions like kits and plans, implicit practices can be more difficult to quantify and 
leverage. Implicit practices are elements of everyday life that make one more prepared. This 
category includes a multitude of activities, to include such things as: the amount of groceries in 
the home, the amount of gas in the car, monetary resources, and social networks. 
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Social networks and especially social capital, have received a notable degree of attention 
in the preparedness literature. While having strong social ties in the community is not something 
lay persons might consider as preparedness, several research efforts have demonstrated that 
social networks may be a key contributor in increasing implicit preparedness (Aldrich & Meyer, 
2014). Research shows that social networks add value to not only individuals, but also to 
communities. Social networks improve information sharing abilities, build adaptive capacity, and 
create opportunities for information flow (Norris, et al., 2008; Hossain &, Kuti, 2010; Baker, 
2013; Aldrich & Meyer, 2014; Akama, Chaplin, & Fairbrother, 2014). Despite a robust body of 
literature focused specifically on preparedness (both implicit and explicit), the question of 
preparedness effectiveness is not fully answered. 
2.7. Conclusion  
The literature reviewed has implications for the practice of emergency management. 
Through an examination of patterns in the literature regarding human behavior during disasters, 
response, social capital, and preparedness, key actions that can be leveraged by emergency 
management practitioners can be identified. As was established by the literature: in most 
situations citizens engage in response in a positive and effective manner (Dynes, 1994; Tierney, 
Lindell, & Perry, 2001; Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; Scanlon, Helsloot & Groenendaal, 2014);  
social capital affects and response (Watchtendorf & Kendra, 2004; Dynes, 2006; Hawkins & 
Maurer, 2010; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015;); and, tangible preparedness actions leverage social 
capital and human behavior to elevate both the formal and informal response (Drabek, 1969; 
Dynes, 2006; Murphy, 2007; LaLone, 2012; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). This literature review 
served to prime the recommendations in the strategy guide (Appendix A).  
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CHAPTER 3: CREATING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE: 
FIVE STRATEGIC DOMAINS 
As a result of the literature review and subsequent analysis, five key strategic domains 
were identified. These domains are: I) Distributed Disaster Messaging Pre-Event; II) Stakeholder 
Engagement; III) Preparing for the Socially Integrated Response; IV) Organizational and 
Individual Trust, and Network-deepening Activities; and V) Warnings and Information 
Dissemination. Each domain contains recommendations for action and tasks that can be pursued 
by emergency management practitioners. Much of the research reviewed either did not contain 
recommendations or did not contain recommendations that could be reasonably distilled or 
adopted. The recommendations provided in the strategy guide may require partnerships, but do 
not require unique or specialized expertise on the part of emergency management practitioners as 
they are rooted in activities already routine to emergency management such as planning, 
messaging, outreach, facilitation and training (Phillips, Neal, & Webb, 2012). 
Information in the literature drove the creation of the five strategic domains. To warrant 
the creation of a strategic domain, several criteria had to be met. First, specific recommendations 
regarding that area of action had to be present. For example, scholars commented that sharing 
information with stakeholders before and after an event (recommendation) (Dynes, 2006) was 
key in preparing for a socially integrated response (Strategic Domain III). Another condition for 
inclusion as a domain, is the domain had to exist in emergency management research rather than 
in outside disciplines in order to translate the literature into practice.  However, research that did 
not have a direct link to emergency management literature could be included under a strategic 
area even if it did not warrant creating a separate strategic domain. The next condition required 
for inclusion was that each strategic area must have the potential to be operationalized in 
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preparedness and must have support from the literature to indicate that it could improve some 
element of response. For example, the literature demonstrates that hardening key strategic 
relationships among stakeholders could improve role clarity and communication in response 
(Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche & Pfefferbaum, 2008). The final condition that must be 
met is the strategic domain has to have emergency management literature that covers topics in 
social capital. For example, Dynes (2006) indicates that emergency management practitioners 
should leverage existing social organizations to create a community disaster narrative 
(recommendation in Strategic Domain I). The five strategic domains proffered represent areas in 
the emergency management literature in which social capital is leveraged as a mode to attain 
greater preparedness for response. 
3.1. Strategic Domain I: Distributed Disaster Messaging Pre-Event 
This strategic domain centers around the findings and recommendations of Dynes (2006). 
This domain is unique in that it examines disaster issues at a community level (i.e., by changing 
attitudes of community ownership and disaster responsibility).  
Changing these attitudes can be addressed through existing social institutions, structures, 
and social capital by creating a shared disaster narrative. Creating this shared narrative can be 
achieved through holding disaster memorials, community wide informational campaigns, and 
providing information to stakeholders (Dynes, 2006). This strategic domain focuses on issues of 
culture, responsibility, and interest rather than more concrete engagements with the community. 
Attitudes often dictate the level of community engagement with disaster topics. This strategic 
domain is listed first because it can act as a catalyst to the other domains and the activities within 
them, not just those leveraging social capital. 
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Table 1: Strategic Domain I 
Strategic Domain I: Distributed Disaster Messaging Pre-Event 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  







Leverage existing social 
constructs/organizations 



















that disasters are 
a local 
responsibility.  








• Hold disaster 
memorials. 
• Provide churches, 




encourages them to 
incorporate these 
messages into 
routine dialogues.  











3.2. Strategic Domain II: Stakeholder Engagement 
Stakeholder engagement presents itself as one of the key focus areas in the emergency 
management literature. The activities suggested often mirror whole community approaches 
suggested by FEMA. Community participation in several key areas, like planning, commonly 
appeared in the literature (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; Dynes, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Norris et 
al., 2008; LaLone, 2012). Suggestions found in this strategic domain move well beyond planning 
and provide an eclectic mix of activities and avenues of preparedness for emergency 
management practitioners. 
Planning is often conducted with an array of stakeholders; however, they are typically 
limited to a core cadre of community organizations (Dynes, 2006). One of the most 
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recommended avenues to enhance preparedness efforts is the promotion of non-traditional 
stakeholder involvement in planning, disaster discussions, and other efforts (Wachtendorf & 
Kendra, 2004; Dynes, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Norris et al., 2008; LaLone, 2012). These 
stakeholders can be solicited to attend planning and informational meetings or to participate in 
whole-community based preparedness planning groups (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; Dynes, 
2006; Murphy, 2007; Norris et al., 2008; LaLone, 2012). The benefits of these activities include 
a more informed public and greater access to, and for, the local emergency management 
practitioner. Additionally, participation in these efforts may lead to greater investment in the 
community and in local public safety/emergency management (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; 
Dynes, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Norris et al., 2008; LaLone, 2012).   
Hand-in-hand with stakeholder involvement comes skill development. This entails 
working with stakeholder partners to discuss disaster roles and provide training or learning 
opportunities in those specific roles. Specific actions revolve around creating and promoting 
educational opportunities specific to groups that may play specialized roles in response such as, 
CERT, first aid, shelter and mass care training (Dynes, 2006). Not only does this type of 
engagement increase the efficacy of the socially distributed response, it allows the emergency 
management practitioner to better understand stakeholder capacity, capability, and potential 
involvement pre-event leading to the ability to better leverage the informal response. 
Lastly, and perhaps the most unorthodox, is creating a “sense of place”. Much like Dynes 
(2006) suggestion to foster a culture of community responsibility and disaster awareness, this 
recommendation aims at the very heart of preparedness - attitudes and investment. Creating a 
sense of place increases preparedness as citizens are more invested in the community (Bihari & 
Ryan, 2012). Specific actions in this realm include tailored messaging, community social events 
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and gatherings, and opportunities for community input and decision-making (Bihari & Ryan, 
2012). 
Table 2: Strategic Domain II 



























• Solicit public and 
private participation 
in disaster-related 
meetings.   
• Establish a 
community-based 
preparedness 
planning group.  
 




disaster activities and 






























• CERT training. 
• First aid efforts. 
• Sheltering training.  
• Mass care training. 
• A community with both 
integrated and trained skills 
for optimal civilian 
response actions.  
 
Dynes, 2006 
II. C.  






and, in turn 
with increased 
preparedness.  
• Community social 
and recreational 
events. 





• Promotes preparedness 











3.3. Strategic Domain III: Preparing for the Socially Integrated Response 
This strategic domain includes a variety of suggestions. This is due to the historically 
poor understanding of the socially integrated response (Dynes, 1994) which has generated a great 
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deal of academic interest. Much of the emergency management literature found in this area is 
constructed with the intent that it can and will be used by emergency management practitioners. 
This strategic domain can be divided into two general categories; planning and outreach. 
Some sources (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; Dynes, 2006) suggest that planning for the 
socially integrated response is necessary to fully leverage the benefits that it can provide. 
Additionally, it is noted that failing to plan for the socially integrated response will cause 
problems in the community and possible conflict between formal and informal response efforts 
(LaLone, 2012). The key planning areas of focus in socially integrated response are volunteer 
management (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; LaLone, 2012), donations management planning 
(LaLone, 2012), and information sharing planning (Dynes, 2006). Specific actions that can be 
taken here include solicitation for stakeholder involvement in planning, communications plans 
for whole-community partners, and volunteer and donations planning (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 
2004; Dynes, 2006; LaLone, 2012). All of these activities should be undertaken through 
relationships with stakeholders who will likely play a lead role in response activities. 
Strategic outreach toward a more functional response is another key area of preparedness 
found in the emergency management literature. Purposefully engaging a wide range of 
stakeholders and a-typical stakeholders for the roles they might play in response is a means by 
which community preparedness can be enhanced (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004). Although this 
area may seem daunting and time consuming to emergency management practitioners, applying 
a strategic lens to identify and solicit key stakeholders in the community will allow for a more 
manageable scale of outreach (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004).  Stakeholders with high strategic 
value might include those with specialized facilities, staff, or resources. 
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Table 3: Strategic Domain III 





in the literature 








social units for 
disaster and 
preparedness 
related activities.  
• Contact local clubs 
and service 
organizations and 
encourage them to 
train and discuss 
disaster related 
topics.  
• Train shelter staff 
to focus on 
sheltering families 
together (as a 
social unit) instead 
of individuals. 
• Leverage high-bonding 
and pre-established social 
capital for improved 







Plan for the 
socially-integrated 
response. 
• Incorporate annex 
and contact 










• Prepares informational 
basis and directed planning 
effort in optimizing the 
socially-integrated 
response.  








by employing a 
wide array of 
communication 
modalities. 
• Share warnings and 
information on 
existing modes of 
communication 
(social media, cell 
phones, etc.).   











• Promotes preparedness 
through linkage facilitation 
and leveraging through 
preplanning and proper 
identification of 




Table 3: Strategic Domain III (continued) 






in the literature 









 • Have plans and 
methods to 
communicate 
unmet needs in the 














in disasters.  
• Partner with higher 
education 
institutions in the 















• Prepares access and 
mobilization to variety of 
community assets. 
• Increase linkage and 




















• Assist community 
partners and 
organizations that 
may utilize or 
attract volunteers 
in: 











• Effective and fully utilized 












Table 3: Strategic Domain III (continued) 






in the literature 












































public release to 
better direct 
incoming aid.  
• Create a template 
pre-event that can 
be easily completed 
when needs arise 
during disaster 
times. This list can 
be released on 
social and 
conventional media 
to help direct 
incoming aid. 
  
• More precise donations 




3.4. Strategic Domain IV: Organizational and Individual Trust, and Network-deepening 
Activities 
This domain is drawn from an eclectic mix of literature and encompasses an array of 
activities that most directly leverage social capital when compared to other strategic domains. 
The emergency management literature provides two major areas of focus within this domain, 
relationship building and promoting community cohesion. 
Social networks can be pictured like any other physical network/infrastructure, as such, 
this infrastructure can be hardened (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004; Norris, 2008). Strengthening 
relationships between stakeholders can better prepare them to communicate and coordinate in 
future response roles (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2004). The direct and conscious creation of a 
disaster-focused social infrastructure is the objective of these suggestions. Facilitating 
introductions between key stakeholders, sensitizing community partners to roles and 
relationships they might develop during response, and social events are a few ways community 
networks can be deepened (Wachtendorf, & Kendra, 2004; Norris et. al, 2008; Reininger, 2013; 
Aldrich & Meyer; 2015). 
Activities to promote community cohesion focus on how individuals’ social capital can 
be expanded to increase overall preparedness. Recommendations focus primarily on social 
engineering activities that help with the promotion of trust and networking in the community 
(Geis, 2000; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Specific examples could include, holding meet-a-neighbor 
events, social activities, and promoting the creation of shared public spaces (Geis, 2000; 
Reininger, 2013; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Partnerships with outside stakeholders are critical to 
implementation of activities in this domain. 
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Table 4: Strategic Domain IV 




in the literature 













together with the 




• Facilitate introductions 
between and among key 
community 
organizations/organizers 
who may play similar or 
























Identify and harden 
established strategic 
relationships with 
key social nodes 
(e.g., churches, 
community centers, 





• Establish regular 
meetings with key area 
stakeholders to cover 






















facilitate events in 








• Hold community events 
focused on getting to 
know those around you. 
• Disaster-themed, 
localized, community 



















currency model.  
• Create a community 
reward system for time 
spent volunteering or 
















• Host or encourage 
community wide events 
like runs, walks, meetings, 













to create social 
spaces in the 
community.  
• Working with community 
partners to create a public 












3.5. Strategic Domain V: Warnings and Information Dissemination 
The final strategic domain contains the greatest variety of recommendations from the 
emergency management literature. This is because warnings and information dissemination have 
been well-studied throughout the course of emergency management research. This domain is 
broken down into two key areas, warnings and information. 
Recommendations for warnings typically seek to manipulate either the content of the 
warnings or individual characteristics pre-event. Warning messages should be constructed to 
better facilitate the social process they are a part of, this means changing message content to 
encourage information spread and expedite confirmation behaviors and milling (Drabek & 
Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 1969; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Kirschenbaum and Rapaport, 2009; Bean, 
et al., 2015; Wood, et al., 2017). Key demographic and social factors shown to influence warning 
reception are isolation (Raid, Norris & Ruback, 1999) and social influence (Drabek & Boggs, 
1968; Raid & Norris, 1998; Sorensen, 2000; Bean, et al., 2015; Wood, et al., 2017). 
Information flow and sharing have similar characteristics in the literature as relationship 
building in that recommendations for improvement typically assume a social infrastructure 
approach. Improving network depth and scope (Drabek, 1969; Raid, Norris & Ruback, 1999 
Norris, et al., 2008; Hossain &, Kuti, 2010; Baker, 2013; Aldrich & Meyer, 2014; Akama, 
Chaplin, & Fairbrother, 2014) are the key areas of focus in enhancing social infrastructure. A 
better social network has been shown to allow information to flow more effectively and aid 
processes such as warnings and confirmation. Specific activities can include pre-disaster 
messaging that encourages planning with family and sharing warning messages (Drabek & 
Boggs, 1968; Raid & Norris, 1998; Kirschenbaum & Rapaport, 2009). 
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Table 5: Strategic Domain V 




in the literature 











networks as they are 
key in information 
transfer and warning 
adherence.  
• Hold community events 
focused on getting to 
know people around you. 
• Tailor messaging to 
increase emphasis on 
social networks, i.e., 
“Share this message with 












and capacity.  
• Facilitated 
peer-
















as it is sought by 
individuals and 
plays a major role in 
decision making.  
• Tailor messaging to 
increase emphasis on 
social networks i.e. 
“Share this message with 


















can be hampered by 
strong social 
embeddedness.  
• Include messaging 
reinforcing that people 
are not losing their 
community if they 
evacuate; evacuations 
are simply protecting the 
people that make up the 
community.   
 



















• Tailor messaging to 
increase emphasis on 
social networks, i.e., 
“Share this message with 
friends and family”. 
 • Recommend planning 
evacuations with friends 
















Table 5: Strategic Domain V (continued) 




in the literature 





this message” in case 
of emergency 
(Hypothetical) 





• Hold pre-event 
campaigns to promote 
sharing information and 
planning considerations 
with each other before 





















and larger social 
networks create 
enhanced capacity 
for information flow 
and sharing.  
• Encourage social network 
improvements through 
community events. 
• Connect with local 
community organizations 
and encourage them to 
run networking 
deepening activities like 














Work to improve 
perceived and actual 
levels of social 
support 
Perceived social 




rates, i.e., lack of 
perceived social 
support results in 
lower evacuation 
rates.  
• Encourage social network 
development and support 
networks with friends 











behaviors with high 
information 
messages.  
If a large amount of 
information is 
provided in 
warnings, the less 
severe milling 
behaviors will be.  
• Provide as much 
information as possible 
in warnings.  
 









3.6. Strategic Domains: Translation into Action 
Though the literature guided the development of these five strategic domains, it 
sometimes failed to provide specific examples of how the findings might be operationalized. As 
part of the analysis, it was necessary to extrapolate some potential tactical approaches from the 
recommendations in order to illustrate how they could be implemented. Every recommendation 
is delineated into principles, benefits, and associated actions in order to move from theory to 
practice. These five domains present emergency management practitioners with new areas to 
innovate and prepare their communities. Through the pragmatic application of research, 
evidence-based systems of preparedness and response can be more easily implemented. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this effort was to provide clear guidance to emergency management 
practitioners underpinned by research findings. The literature review herein provides a sound 
basis for the strategy guide (Appendix A). Through the exploration of foundational 
understandings of human behavior during disaster and the exploration of social capital (from an 
emergency management perspective) a solid foundation by which research findings can be 
brought to practice was developed. 
It is worth noting that a limited number of the sources are included in the strategy guide. 
This highlights a deficit in the emergency management literature relative to the extrapolation of 
findings to practice and challenges future researchers to more intently focus on what the 
takeaways are from their research for emergency management practitioners. Translating findings 
to practice should be a purposeful effort to advance the overall emergency management mission.  
The need to communicate, consolidate, and develop the emergency management literature base 
has never been more urgent. As the discipline continues to evolve, those in academia must strive 
to translate theory to practice. Utilizing social capital as a means to greater success in 
preparedness and response activities is perhaps the lowest hanging fruit; many other areas 
deserve a like focus and extrapolation of recommendations for practice. The collective benefits 
of integration between findings and practice are far-reaching and necessary to secure the safety 
and security of our nation as we move into periods of ever-growing threat. 
4.1. Limitations 
There are limitations within this effort. First, the literature reviewed herein is certainly 
not all that could have been considered. Even within the disciplinary bounds of emergency 
management, more research could be found of these topics. Second, focusing solely on 
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emergency management literature is another shortcoming. A deeper understanding of 
interdisciplinary crossovers with fields like psychology, community development, and sociology 
could likely yield additional relevant literature pertinent to these topics. Finally, relevant research 
conducted and published outside of the United States could have also been included. With 
further review in these areas, it is possible that additional strategic domains could be identified. 
4.2. Areas for Future Research 
Future research should be directed toward studying communities in which social capital 
is actively cultivated as a means to further preparedness and response success. The various 
modes and strategies to do so are numerous and case studies on their effectiveness could benefit 
preparedness and response research greatly. Rethinking and studying preparedness and response 
from the lens of a social process could yield advancements in both research and practice. 
Another key area of investment for future researchers is the translation of research to 
practice. More effort should be directed toward the ways in which implementation and 
knowledge gaps can be closed. Indeed, studies testing the effectiveness of the modality for 
translation used in this report would provide insight into the ways in which translation is best 
accomplished and delivered. As research and practice efforts continue to inform and challenge 
each other, it is imperative to discover the modes most effective in sharing the information 
relevant to enhancing successful practice. 
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This strategy guide is not meant to be comprehensive; rather, it presents those recommendations 
















Strategic Domain I: Distributed Disaster Messaging Pre-Event 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 




Leverage existing social 
constructs/organizations 
to integrate disaster 
narrative 
Use existing socially 
integrated 
organizations 
(religious, civil or 
public) to incorporate 
disaster responsibility 
into their respective 
narratives. Ensure 
this narrative is 
uniform across the 
community and 
reinforces that 
disasters are a local 
responsibility.  





• Hold disaster memorials. 
• Provide churches, schools, 
and other civic 
organizations with 
informational materials 
that encourages them to 
incorporate these 
messages into routine 
dialogues.  













Strategic Domain II: Stakeholder Engagement    
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 




Promote traditional and 
non-traditional 
stakeholder engagement 
Encourage a wide 






preparedness topics.  
• Solicit public and private 
participation in disaster-
related meetings.   
• Establish a community-
based preparedness 
planning group.  
 




in disaster activities and 


















Promote skill development   
Promote stakeholder 
skill development in 
probable disaster role 
areas.  
• CERT training. 
• First aid efforts. 
• Sheltering training.  
• Mass care training. 
• A community with both 
integrated and trained 
skills for optimal civilian 
response actions.  
 
Dynes, 2006 
II. C.  
Foster “sense of place” 
“Sense of Place” is 
correlated with social 
capital, and, in turn 
with increased 
preparedness.  
• Community social and 
recreational events. 




• Promotes preparedness 
through strong sense of 
place.  












Strategic Domain III. Preparing for the Socially Integrated Response 
 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 





existing social units 
Target existing social 
units for disaster and 
preparedness related 
activities.  
• Contact local clubs and 
service organizations and 
encourage them to train 
and discuss disaster 
related topics.  
• Train shelter staff to focus 
on sheltering families 
together (as a social unit) 





• Leverage high-bonding 
and pre-established social 
capital for improved 




Plan for integrated 
response 
Plan for the socially-
integrated response. 
• Incorporate annex and 
contact information for 
key community players 
based on relationships and 
past response patterns.  
• Choose donations and 
volunteer collection 






• Prepares informational 
basis and directed 
planning effort in 
optimizing the socially-
integrated response.  





Strategic Domain III. Preparing for the Socially Integrated Response (continued) 
 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 




Share information with 
stakeholders 
Share information 
with stakeholders by 




• Share warnings and 
information on existing 
modes of communication 
(social media, cell phones, 
etc.).   
• Discover and plan for 
special communication 




• Have plans and methods 
to communicate unmet 
needs in the community 















preplanning and proper 
identification of 







Strategic Domain III. Preparing for the Socially Integrated Response (continued) 
 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 











typically involved in 
disasters.  
• Partner with higher 
education institutions in 
the local area for disaster-
related curriculum 
applications.  
• Establish partnerships 
with organizations who 
hold potentially key assets 
(facilities, expertise, 
communications 
equipment, etc.) during 















• Prepares access and 
mobilization to variety of 
community assets. 
• Increase linkage and 












Strategic Domain III. Preparing for the Socially Integrated Response (continued) 
 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 













• Assist community partners 
and organizations that may 
utilize or attract volunteers 
in: 
o developing clear plans 
that include setting 
boundaries so 
volunteers know exactly 
what they will be doing. 
o developing clear plans 
that include 
credentialing protocols 
to ensure all volunteers 
are trained, accounted 
for and sorted by skills 
and experience levels.  
o educating volunteers 
about community 
response systems.  
• Establish lines of 
communication pre-
disaster to communicate 
with key volunteer 
organizations during 
disaster.  
• Effective and fully 
utilized volunteer 















Strategic Domain III. Preparing for the Socially Integrated Response (continued) 
 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 




Prepare and disseminate 
donations guidelines 
Prepare a volunteer 
and donations 
guideline for public 
release to better direct 
incoming aid.  
• Create a template pre-
event that can be easily 
completed when needs 
arise during disaster times. 
This list can be released 
on social and conventional 
media to help direct 
incoming aid.  
• More precise donations 







Strategic Domain IV. Organizational and Individual Trust, and Network-deepening Activities   
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 












together with the goal 




• Facilitate introductions 
between and among key 
community 
organizations/organizers 
who may play similar or 
supporting roles in 
response. 
• Increased response 
effectiveness through 
high organizational 












Harden established key 
relationships 
Identify and harden 
established strategic 
relationships with key 
social nodes (e.g., 
churches, community 





• Establish regular meetings 
with key area stakeholders 
to cover disaster topics.  
 
 
• Sensitize community 
social nodes to disaster 
topics, local emergency 
management and 
potential implications and 







Sponsor and facilitate 





and residents within 
close proximity. 
• Hold community events 
focused on getting to 
know those around you. 
• Disaster-themed, 
localized, community 
social and educational 
events. 
  
• Enhance citizen 
preparedness through high 
bonding and trust building 







Strategic Domain IV. Organizational and Individual Trust, and Network-deepening Activities (continued) 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 










currency model.  
• Create a community 
reward system for time 
spent volunteering or taking 
certain courses. 
 
• Promote preparedness 
through high bonding and 










• Host or encourage 
community wide events like 
runs, walks, meetings, 
socials etc.  
• Promotes preparedness 









to create social spaces 
in the community.  
• Working with community 
partners to create a public 
park or community center.  
• Promotes preparedness 
















Strategic Domain V. Warnings and Information Dissemination 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 




Leverage social networks 




networks as they are 
key in information 
transfer and warning 
adherence.  
• Hold community events 
focused on getting to 
know people around you. 
• Tailor messaging to 
increase emphasis on 
social networks, i.e., 
“Share this message with 
friends and family”.  
 
 
• Increased information 
sharing and warning 
adherence through 
increased individual 
network usage and 
capacity.  
• Facilitated peer-
















as it is sought by 
individuals and plays 
a major role in 
decision making.  
• Tailor messaging to 
increase emphasis on 
social networks i.e. “Share 
this message with friends 
and family”. 
 
• Facilitated social 
confirmation through 











can be hampered by 
strong social 
embeddedness.  
• Include messaging 
reinforcing that people are 
not losing their 
community if they 
evacuate; evacuations are 
simply protecting the 
people that make up the 




• Reduce the negative 
impact of social 
embeddedness on 
evacuation warnings.   
 






Strategic Domain V. Warnings and Information Dissemination (continued) 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 




Emphasize “sharing this 
message” 
(Actual) Social 




• Tailor messaging to 
increase emphasis on 
social networks, i.e., 
“Share this message with 
friends and family”. 
 • Recommend planning 
evacuations with friends 
and family.  
 
 
•  Promote warning 
adherence through actual 
social influence.   
 
Riad, & Norris, 
1998 
V. E. 
Emphasize “sharing this 
message” in case of 
emergency 
(Hypothetical) Social 




• Hold pre-event campaigns 
to promote sharing 
information and planning 
considerations with each 














• Increase openness to 
social influence to 
enhance social 
confirmation effects.  
 






Strategic Domain V. Warnings and Information Dissemination (continued) 
Strategic domain/ 
sub-domain identified  
in the literature 








More established and 
larger social networks 
create enhanced 
capacity for 
information flow and 
sharing.  
• Encourage social network 
improvements through 
community events. 
• Connect with local 
community organizations 
and encourage them to run 
networking deepening 
activities like meetings 
and social events. 
 
 
• Greater warning and 
information flow and 
sharing. 
 
Riad, Norris, & 
Ruback, 1999 
V. G. 
Work to improve 
perceived and actual levels 
of social support 
Perceived social 
support (level of 
isolation) is 
negatively correlated 
with evacuation rates, 
i.e., lack of perceived 
social support results 
in lower evacuation 
rates.  
• Encourage social network 
development and support 
networks with friends and 
neighbors.  
 
• Increased evacuation 
rates.  
 




Reduce milling behaviors 
with high information 
messages.  
If a large amount of 
information is 
provided in warnings, 
the less severe 
milling behaviors will 
be.  
• Provide as much 
information as possible in 
warnings.  
 
• Expedite or eliminate 
milling behaviors.  
 
Wood, et al, 
2017.  
 
